package auth

import (
	"context"
	"crypto/rand"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"encoding/hex"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"math/big"
	"net/http"
	"net/url"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"kjol/security"
)

// dummyHash is compared against when no user matches, so a login for an unknown
// identifier costs the same bcrypt work as one for a known identifier with the
// wrong password. Without it, response time alone would enumerate valid accounts.
const dummyHash = "$2a$14$KW5OO1wZqGGq3SrpBFj0Oema5DG8Ph7lZJvq0ECkkYBpNFom6b9vO"

// maxLoginJitter bounds the random delay added to every login.
const maxLoginJitter = 500 * time.Millisecond

// Login verifies an identifier and password and, on success, mints and persists
// a session. It returns the resulting Principal and the raw session key, which
// is the credential the caller hands to the client — as a cookie via
// SetSessionCookie, or as a bearer token in a JSON response.
//
// Every failure path returns ErrInvalidCredentials: unknown identifier, wrong
// password, and locked-out account are indistinguishable to the caller.
func (a *Authenticator) Login(ctx context.Context, identifier, password string, meta SessionMeta) (Principal, string, error) {
	// Partial timing-attack mitigation: a uniform random delay on every attempt.
	//
	// This does not eliminate the timing signal — an attacker averaging enough
	// samples can still separate "user exists, bad password" from "no such user"
	// — but it raises the sample count needed by orders of magnitude, which is
	// what makes it effective in combination with the lockout below and
	// per-IP rate limiting at the edge.
	//
	// https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/96489/can-i-prevent-timing-attacks-with-random-delays/96493#96493
	jitter, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(int64(maxLoginJitter/time.Millisecond)))
	if err == nil {
		time.Sleep(time.Duration(jitter.Int64()) * time.Millisecond)
	}

	user, err := a.dir.FindByIdentifier(ctx, identifier)
	lockedOut := a.cfg.MaxLoginAttempts > 0 && user.FailedLoginAttempts > a.cfg.MaxLoginAttempts

	if err != nil || lockedOut {
		// Spend the same bcrypt time as the success path before bailing.
		security.ComparePasswords(password, dummyHash)
		return Principal{}, "", ErrInvalidCredentials
	}

	if !security.ComparePasswords(password, user.PasswordHash) {
		// Best-effort: a failure to record the attempt must not grant access.
		_ = a.dir.RecordLoginResult(ctx, user, false)
		return Principal{}, "", ErrInvalidCredentials
	}

	if err := a.dir.RecordLoginResult(ctx, user, true); err != nil {
		return Principal{}, "", fmt.Errorf("auth: record login: %w", err)
	}

	return a.StartSession(ctx, user, meta)
}

// StartSession mints, persists, and resolves permissions for a session for an
// already-authenticated user. Login calls it after verifying a password; an app
// calls it directly when a user proved themselves some other way (SSO callback,
// an email magic link, impersonation by an admin).
//
// It returns the Principal and the raw session key.
func (a *Authenticator) StartSession(ctx context.Context, user User, meta SessionMeta) (Principal, string, error) {
	key, err := security.GenerateRandomKeyBase64(a.cfg.KeyBytes)
	if err != nil {
		return Principal{}, "", fmt.Errorf("auth: generate session key: %w", err)
	}

	now := time.Now()
	session := Session{
		// ID is intentionally left zero: the store (or its database default)
		// assigns it.
		Key:        key,
		UserID:     user.ID,
		OrgID:      user.OrgID,
		Created:    now,
		Expiration: now.Add(a.cfg.SessionTTL),
		Timezone:   user.Timezone,
		IPAddr:     meta.IPAddr,
		UserAgent:  meta.UserAgent,
	}

	if a.cfg.MaxActiveSessions > 0 {
		if err := a.store.EnforceSessionLimit(ctx, user.ID, a.cfg.MaxActiveSessions); err != nil {
			return Principal{}, "", fmt.Errorf("auth: enforce session limit: %w", err)
		}
	}

	if err := a.store.Insert(ctx, session); err != nil {
		return Principal{}, "", fmt.Errorf("auth: insert session: %w", err)
	}

	return Principal{
		Authenticated: true,
		Session:       session,
		Permissions:   a.resolvePermissions(ctx, session),
	}, key, nil
}

// Logout revokes the session with the given key. Revoking an already-revoked or
// unknown session is not an error.
func (a *Authenticator) Logout(ctx context.Context, key string) error {
	if key == "" {
		return nil
	}
	if err := a.store.Revoke(ctx, key); err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, ErrSessionNotFound) {
			return nil
		}
		return fmt.Errorf("auth: revoke session: %w", err)
	}
	return nil
}

// SessionKeyFrom extracts the session key a request presents, preferring an
// Authorization: Bearer token over the session cookie. It returns the key and
// whether it came from a bearer token.
func (a *Authenticator) SessionKeyFrom(r *http.Request) (key string, bearer bool) {
	if h := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); strings.HasPrefix(h, "Bearer ") {
		return strings.TrimPrefix(h, "Bearer "), true
	}
	if c, err := r.Cookie(a.cfg.CookieName); err == nil && c != nil {
		return c.Value, false
	}
	return "", false
}

// LoadContext resolves the request's session and permissions and attaches the
// Principal to its context. It is the outermost auth middleware; Require and
// friends read what it attached.
//
// With requireAuth false, an unauthenticated request is served anyway, carrying
// the zero Principal — for pages that render differently when signed in. With
// requireAuth true, an unauthenticated request is rejected: JSON 401 for API and
// bearer-token clients, a redirect to LoginPath for browsers (or a bare 401 when
// Config.Redirect is false).
func (a *Authenticator) LoadContext(h http.HandlerFunc, requireAuth bool) http.HandlerFunc {
	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		// Every one of these is per-request state. Hoisting any of it into the
		// enclosing closure would share it across concurrent requests on this
		// route: a single bearer-token request could then disable redirects for
		// every browser request that followed.
		key, bearer := a.SessionKeyFrom(r)
		wantsJSON := bearer || isAPIRequest(r)
		redirect := a.cfg.Redirect && !wantsJSON

		session, err := a.lookupSession(r.Context(), key)
		if err != nil || !session.Valid() {
			expired := err == nil && !session.Revoked && session.Expired()
			a.rejectUnauthenticated(w, r, h, requireAuth, wantsJSON, redirect, expired)
			return
		}

		principal := Principal{
			Authenticated: true,
			Session:       session,
			Permissions:   a.resolvePermissions(r.Context(), session),
		}

		// An authenticated user asking for the login page gets sent home.
		if redirect && r.URL.Path == a.cfg.LoginPath {
			http.Redirect(w, r, a.cfg.DefaultPath, http.StatusFound)
			return
		}

		h(w, withPrincipal(r, principal))
	}
}

// lookupSession fetches the session for a key, treating an empty key as a miss
// without troubling the store.
func (a *Authenticator) lookupSession(ctx context.Context, key string) (Session, error) {
	if key == "" {
		return Session{}, ErrSessionNotFound
	}
	return a.store.FetchByKey(ctx, key)
}

// rejectUnauthenticated handles a request with no usable session: serve it
// anyway when auth is optional, otherwise reject in whichever dialect the client
// speaks.
func (a *Authenticator) rejectUnauthenticated(
	w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, h http.HandlerFunc,
	requireAuth, wantsJSON, redirect, expired bool,
) {
	if !requireAuth {
		h(w, withPrincipal(r, Principal{}))
		return
	}

	if wantsJSON {
		reason := "valid authentication required"
		if expired {
			reason = "session expired"
		}
		respondJSONError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Unauthorized: "+reason)
		return
	}

	if expired {
		// The browser is holding a cookie that will never work again.
		a.ClearSessionCookie(w)
	}

	// Don't bounce the login/logout pages back to themselves.
	if redirect && r.URL.Path != a.cfg.LoginPath && r.URL.Path != a.cfg.LogoutPath {
		http.Redirect(w, r, a.cfg.LoginPath+"?redirect="+url.QueryEscape(r.URL.String()), http.StatusFound)
		return
	}
	if !redirect && r.URL.Path != a.cfg.LoginPath {
		http.Error(w, "Error: Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	// Unauthenticated, on the login page itself: serve it.
	h(w, withPrincipal(r, Principal{}))
}

// maxCookieBytes is the per-domain cookie budget browsers enforce.
const maxCookieBytes = 4096

// SetSessionCookie writes the session key as the app's HttpOnly session cookie.
// Use it for browser form logins; API clients get the raw key from Login instead.
//
// When remember is false the cookie is a session cookie: it dies with the
// browser. When true it carries the session's own expiration.
//
// It fails rather than silently truncating if the domain's other cookies leave
// no room — a session cookie that the browser drops would look like a login that
// mysteriously does nothing.
func (a *Authenticator) SetSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p Principal, remember bool) error {
	var otherBytes int
	for _, c := range r.Cookies() {
		if c.Name != a.cfg.CookieName {
			otherBytes += len(c.Value)
		}
	}

	// The 8 bytes are slack for cookie framing overhead.
	if len(p.Session.Key)+otherBytes+8 > maxCookieBytes {
		return fmt.Errorf("auth: cannot set session cookie, domain cookies exceed %d bytes", maxCookieBytes)
	}

	cookie := &http.Cookie{
		Name:     a.cfg.CookieName,
		Value:    p.Session.Key,
		HttpOnly: true,
		Path:     "/",
		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
		Secure:   r.TLS != nil,
	}
	if remember {
		cookie.Expires = p.Session.Expiration
	}

	http.SetCookie(w, cookie)
	return nil
}

// ClearSessionCookie expires the session cookie in the client. It does not
// revoke the session server-side — pair it with Logout.
func (a *Authenticator) ClearSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter) {
	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
		Name:    a.cfg.CookieName,
		Value:   "",
		MaxAge:  -1,
		Expires: time.Unix(1, 0),
		Path:    "/",
	})
}

// HashAPIKey returns the digest under which an API key is stored and looked up.
// Only the digest is ever persisted, so a leaked database yields no usable keys.
func HashAPIKey(raw string) string {
	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(raw))
	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}

// LoadAPIKey authenticates a request with an organization-scoped API key from
// Authorization: Bearer, and attaches an API-key Principal. It is the
// non-interactive counterpart to LoadContext, for machine-facing endpoints.
//
// The Principal carries the key's org but no user and no permissions. Routes
// mounted behind this middleware are therefore gated by the mount itself, not by
// Require — which would deny them, there being no permissions to match.
//
// Requires Config.APIKeys; without it every request is rejected.
func (a *Authenticator) LoadAPIKey(h http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		if a.cfg.APIKeys == nil {
			respondJSONError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Unauthorized: API key authentication is not configured")
			return
		}

		authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
		if !strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") {
			respondJSONError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Unauthorized: API key required")
			return
		}

		key, err := a.cfg.APIKeys.FindAPIKeyByHash(r.Context(), HashAPIKey(strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ")))
		if err != nil || key.Revoked {
			respondJSONError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Unauthorized: invalid or revoked API key")
			return
		}

		// Last-used is bookkeeping: don't make the caller wait on it, and don't
		// let the request's cancellation abort the write.
		go a.cfg.APIKeys.TouchAPIKey(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), key.ID)

		h(w, withPrincipal(r, Principal{
			Authenticated: true,
			IsAPIKey:      true,
			Session:       Session{OrgID: &key.OrgID},
			Permissions:   map[string]bool{},
		}))
	}
}

// isAPIRequest reports whether a request should be answered in JSON rather than
// with a redirect.
func isAPIRequest(r *http.Request) bool {
	return strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/")
}

// respondJSONError writes a JSON error body. The message is engine-authored, so
// it needs no escaping.
func respondJSONError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, message string) {
	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(status)
	fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"error": %q}`, message)
}